Yesterday’s and today’s nuclear arms control agreements (e.g., INF, START, New START) have often utilized delivery platforms as the primary item of account, although New START now actually has procedures to confirm declared warhead numbers. Future nuclear arms agreements will likely need more intrusive measures to confirm nuclear warheads, and their numbers, especially as the United States and Russia, and potentially other states seek lower levels of deployed and/or total nuclear weapons.

Undeniably, the sensitivity directly associated with warhead design, vulnerability concerns, and use control are highly classified and must be protected (as required under the US Atomic Energy Act), and hence require strong measures to protect such information. Nevertheless, the demand for verification and transparency is increasing, and the potential of non-nuclear weapon state participation in a monitoring role makes such needs even more challenging (e.g., explicit limits on transfer of nuclear weapon information per Article I/II of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT)).

The United States has sought strong verification measures for all arms control agreements it has entered into, and the United States government is required to demonstrate that any treaty is “effectively verifiable” to attain ratification from Congress. The tension between transparency and secrecy, and the need to have robust verification demand the examination of potential alternate strategies and mechanisms for future arms control agreements.

Given a long history of past agreement verification mechanisms (e.g., INF verification approaches, the Trilateral Initiative, and the recent UK/Norway experiment), the slow rate progress, and its cause, should be discussed and understood fully.

For decades, we have been engaged in such analysis and discussions, and continue to do so. It is important to discuss, assess and review the positives and negatives of past efforts and help frame options for the future (including attribute, template and other concepts). We will discuss issues related to the interplay of transparency and classification in nuclear arms control past and present options, and explore limitations and constraints — and how sharing of certain limited classified/sensitive information has been achieved (and/or controlled) in the past, and could be potentially achieved in the future.