Tuesday, July 24
Overview of Physical Protection Upgrades for Radioactive Sources in Belarus
Uladzimir Kruhlou1, Ivan Adamovich1, Edward Godfrey2, Pavel Mikhalevich1, Stephen Mladineo3, Gary Stubblefield4, Aliaksandr Shmytau1.
1Isotope Technologies CJSC, Minsk, Belarus, 2Mission Support and Test Services, LLC, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 3Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA, 4Vantage Systems, Inc., Missoula, MT, USA.
The “Isotope Technologies” (IT) team has gained extensive experience in installation, adjustment and maintenance of physical protection systems in the scope of the U.S. Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Program in Belarus. Since 2011, the team has upgraded 28 facilities. These facilities include stationary facilities such as medical gamma units, warehouses of sealed radioactive sources, an industrial plant, and included provisions for special transport vehicles. A smaller number of sites using mobile radiography non–destructive test cameras (defectoscopes) have also received physical protection upgrades. One of the challenges is to protect the radiographic materials both in storage and while in use in the field. This presentation will review the structure and components of physical protection systems as well as describe experience in remote monitoring of mobile defectoscope sites and vehicles from Central Alarm Stations (CAS). We propose to share our experience and lessons learned in sustainability of physical protection systems. Belarus developed the initial ORS sustainability model for keeping ORS systems in operational condition once the U.S. obligation ends at the close of 36 months of warranty and maintenance support. Much of the success came from establishing a quarterly maintenance of installed equipment (to include reporting/tracking of incidences) and training courses provided by IT/US ORS Support Program team. The presenters will also review their experience in developing Security Management and Security Culture for facility staff personnel.
INMM Safeguards Information Management Working Group Poster
Gary L. Hirsch.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA.
In 2016, the INMM International Safeguards Technical Division launched the Safeguards Information Management Working Group. The working group’s formation has been well received and currently has grown to approximately 40 registered members. The working group is focused on identifying good practices, new concepts, and approaches to data collection, processing, and creating output for reporting to national authorities and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The objective is to make the information management component of international safeguards more efficient and effective. This includes efforts supporting reports and declarations under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, or a Voluntary Offer Agreement. The working group membership is comprised of professionals with diverse backgrounds from every facet of the international safeguards arena. The first formal meeting of the group was held at the 2017 Annual INMM Meeting where the members were able to physically meet, discuss pressing issues, and share ideas and information. During the year communication is maintained via emails and teleconferences. The Safeguards Information Management Working Group is looking to increase its membership and is seeking members with geographic and nuclear fuel cycle diversity. If interested in joining, please contact one of the co-chairs (Kim Gilligan at Brookhaven National Laboratory, email@example.com or Gary Hirsch at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, firstname.lastname@example.org).
Next-Generation Arms-Control Agreements based on Emerging Radiation Detection Technologies
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA.
Nuclear arms-control agreements subsist on the ability of interested parties to achieve verification of properties or processes at a sufficient level. How a sufficient level is defined is open-ended and presents a challenge in producing the overall agreement. Two main factors that define a party’s verification capabilities are the strategic outcomes desired from the agreement and the technical means to produce certainty in the observations or measurements. With radiation detection presenting one of the few means for non-destructive assay, the advent of new technologies in this field will increase the technical means available for a hypothetical agreement made in the future. If technical means allow for increased certainty in verification, different policy objectives not previously available will become possible. This research seeks to understand how new devices and methods for measuring and quantifying radiation signals affect the goals and outcomes for hypothetical arms-control agreements. Radiation detection use in current treaties such as New START and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty has been limited to simple neutron counting. More complex detection techniques have long existed that can quantify warhead attributes such as isotopic composition, fissile mass, and materials surrounding the warhead, but they have presented an unacceptable risk for compromising sensitive information. New detection development specifically in the arms-control field has made it a priority to factor in both authentication and certification considerations. With new technologies such as information barriers improving certification potential, the framework of hypothetical arms-control agreements using these technologies is examined to determine objectives that were not previously feasible. This work is significant because it examines verification means for treaty structures that may be required in the future if weapons reductions continue. With fewer weapons, arms-control treaties focused on counting warheads would be less important than determining the effectiveness of individual weapons. In considering a hypothetical framework that evaluates weapon effectiveness, technical means for verification must be well understood and studied in parallel to the policy effects of these agreements.
Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Group at Virginia Commonwealth University
Manit D. Shah, Braden Goddard.
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA.
Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) has recently expanded its teaching and research capabilities in the area of nonproliferation. To this end, a Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation (NSN) Group has been formed and led by Braden Goddard (Assistant Professor) and supported by Manit Shah (Research Assistant Professor). With this expansion, a more diverse curriculum has been developed and the wide range of research projects are being pursued. The NSN Group has three laboratories: the Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Laboratory, the Radiation Detection and Measurement Laboratory, and the Environmental Radionuclide Assay Laboratory. These laboratories form the backbone of the technical nonproliferation research activities at VCU. Presently, the NSN Group has 9 students, 5 undergraduate and 4 graduate, pursuing projects in the field of the nuclear fuel cycle, safeguards, radiation detection, and nuclear security. A poster will be prepared to highlight the capabilities of the NSN Group and the areas where our group would like to expand further.
ARG-US “Traveler” for Tracking and Monitoring Conveyances
Yung Y. Liu1, Brian Craig1, Haripriya Mehta1, James Shuler2.
1Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, USA, 2U.S. Department of Energy, Washington D.C., DC, USA.
The ARG-US “Traveler” is being developed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management. It is the latest innovative product in the family of ARG-US (meaning “Watchful Guardian”) remote monitoring systems technology for risk-significant materials in cargo conveyances during transportation by truck, rail, or ship. Risk-significant materials may include nuclear and other radioactive materials, radiological sources, and/or hazardous chemicals, for which safety, security, and safeguards are major concerns, as the threats of sabotage and theft are real with very serious potential consequences. The Traveler’s modular platform allows sensors to be added or removed (i.e., customized) with relative ease. For example, the Traveler’s modular suite of sensors may include, depending on monitoring need, temperature, humidity, and radiation (gamma and neutron) sensors, as well as an accelerometer, an electronic loop seal, and a digital camera. The Traveler uses redundant methods (i.e., cellular and satellite) for the transmission of sensor data, alarm annunciation when sensor thresholds are violated, and clearance of alarms remotely from a command center. Powered by rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, the Traveler, in its current configuration, can support continuous tracking and monitoring for up to 6 days. The Traveler is supported by secured data servers; a secured web application user interface is accessible to authorized users anywhere in the world. This paper will provide highlights of the Traveler’s field tests conducted during 2017, including both vehicles on local and Interstate highways and the rail shipment of the ENSA/DOE transport cask tests during its journey from Baltimore, MD, to Pueblo, CO, in July-August 2017. In addition to enabling real-time tracking of geographical locations of the transport cask on a publicly accessible webpage, the sensors in the Traveler provided a large amount of data—for example, the 3-axis digital accelerometer transmitted data that could be used for analyses and possible correlation to events with associated geographic locations and time stamps. New webpage functions and analytics are also being developed, including average train speeds, segmented terrain videos, and algorithms for the implementation of geo-fencing.
NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION USERS AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION
Shraddha Rane, Courtney Sheffield, Eric Foss, Jason Harris.
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA.
Significant progress has been made globally to secure vulnerable nuclear materials. But, as threats constantly evolve, attention to nuclear security in non-nuclear material specific industries, such as academic institutions and medical facilities, has become increasingly important. To assess and evaluate nuclear security culture at an academic institution, a written survey was developed and conducted on radioactive material users. The survey consisted of a series of questions segregated into four categories: policy, enforcement, leadership, and behavior. The policy category focused on the participant’s awareness towards the academic institution’s policy, dissemination of information, and accountability towards adherence of procedures. The enforcement category pertained to the qualities of security control enforced, penalties assessed for non-compliance and the participant’s opinion towards reporting violations in the institution. The questions on leadership explored the participant’s beliefs on the frequency of inspection and walkthroughs performed by leaders, compliance on the secure use of radioactive materials, and effective communication on the importance of security at the workplace. The behavior category comprised of questions related to the participant’s attitude towards overall global threat, the difference between nuclear safety and security and the response preparedness of the institution to overcome a threat. Users were classified based on age group, work classification and radioactive material work experience. A series of eight nuclear security awareness questions formed a subset of the four nuclear security categories. Results showed that students and radioactive material users in the “20’s” age group possessed a greater degree of awareness towards nuclear security than faculty, other more experienced radioactive material users, and older age group individuals. The response from all three user classification groups emphasized the need to enhance threat response preparedness. The data also implied the need to facilitate effective communication between leaders (faculty and other staff members) and students for establishing a stronger nuclear security culture at the institution. Most of the survey outcomes were verified through in-person interviews. A customized education and training program, based on the level of experience with radioactive materials, was proposed as a form of corrective action to address gaps in nuclear security awareness at the academic institution.
How to Calibrate a Neutron Correlation Counter: Let Us Count the Ways
Angela T. Simone1, Jason P. Hayward1, Robert D. McElroy2, Stephen Croft2.
1University of Tennessee/ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Knoxville, TN, USA, 2Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA.
Passive neutron correlation counting is a commonly applied technique for the nondestructive assay of plutonium-bearing items. In some cases, it may be applied to assay uranium as well. Active neutron correlation counting can be used for uranium, plutonium, and mixtures of both. The dynamic range of samples extends from milligrams to multiple kilograms for both current passive and active assay techniques; these techniques also remain attractive when severe gamma attenuation is present. Coupled with its comparative simplicity, robustness, and stability, neutron correlation counting is well established and heavily relied on for nondestructive assay. For best results, calibration using representative items of known nuclear material content is preferred, but is not always possible. However, to meet a given data quality objective, it is not always necessary. An acceptable calibration can often be achieved using the best practical means and physics arguments with a fraction of the resources of a traditional mass calibration. Field measurements, waste assay, and special investigation of a small number of nonstandard items are prime examples for this strategy. Accepting this philosophy, it is evident that there is not just a single calibration approach, but many. In this paper, we outline several calibration methods for neutron correlation counters that we consider to be technically defensible, depending on the measurement scenario and local availability of materials and expertise. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to initiate a dialog on this topic.
Key words: Neutron correlation counting, best practical means, nondestructive assay
ARG-US Remote Area Modular Monitoring: Digital Camera Enhancing Safety and Security
Brian Craig1, Yung Liu1, Kevin Byrne1, James Shuler2.
1Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, USA, 2U.S. Department of Energy: Office of Environmental Management, Washington, D.C., DC, USA.
ARG-US Remote Area Modular Monitoring (RAMM) is as an expandable, adaptable system for monitoring critical nuclear fuel cycle facilities, such as nuclear power plants, fuel production and reprocessing facilities, spent fuel dry storage systems, decommissioned plants and facilities, and underground repositories. ARG-US RAMM is being developed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management. The ARG-US RAMM architecture is designed on a modular platform to accommodate an expandable array of sensors that may include external thermocouples for temperature, humidity, and radiation (gamma and neutron) sensors, as well as an accelerometer and electronic loop seal. A digital camera, or optical sensor, is the latest sensor that has been successfully incorporated into the RAMM platform. The digital camera greatly enhances RAMM capabilities, providing an essential set of “eyes” covering selected areas of continual operations. The digital-camera-equipped RAMM units enhance safety by providing views in areas that may be inaccessible during a disruptive event. Switching automatically to battery backup and wireless sensor network (WSN), the RAMM units can transmit images, in addition to other sensor data, from areas where the landline-based surveillance assets are lost, such as during the crucial periods of the Fukushima accident. The digital camera can also enhance security during normal facility operation by applying algorithms to detect motion and/or events and, in subsequently, triggering an alert/alarm for any abnormal activities and enabling timely response. This paper describes the development and preliminary testing of distributed RAMM units, each equipped with a digital camera and other sensors in separate buildings at Argonne, focusing on image processing and video archives that pose challenges on information management and data storage. We believe our image processing can be further enhanced by incorporating artificial intelligence to allow for visual accounting of assets in the vision space, a capability similar to using computer vision for facial recognition. The pixel-based images accumulated over time—coupled with process knowledge in facilities—will be used as data input for machine learning, thus further improving algorithms for identifying potential abnormalities and reducing false alarms.
Estimating the Singles Background Rate During a Passive Neutron Correlation Counter assay
Stephen Croft1, Martyn T. Swinhoe2, Andrea Favalli2, Robert D. McElroy1.
1Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA, 2Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA.
Passive neutron time-correlation counting makes use of various auto-correlation counting rates, for example, in the case of multiplicity counting these are the singles, doubles and triples rates, derived from the neutron detector pulse train. In an operating nuclear facility the singles background rate at the time of an assay performed with a passive neutron correlation counter may differ markedly from that at the time of system set-up. The magnitude of the difference will depend on the amount and location of special nuclear material in storage nearby and possibly also on the prevailing cosmic ray intensity which can influence ambient neutron production in and around the detector. The background corrected singles rate could consequently be biased and this will impact the quality of the assay result for those analysis modes (known-α and multiplicity) that rely on using the singles rate in the inversion of the point-model equations. A means to estimate the singles background rate during the assay is therefore desirable especially for weak sources involving long counts where a background performed before and after would considerably reduce item throughput. We derive an expression to predict the singles background count rate at the time of a passive neutron time-correlation count performed with a multi-ring neutron detector. The method makes use of the inner-to-outer ring ratio and requires a background measurement during a quiescent period to be recorded as well as a reference measurement using a representative item. The approach will be most useful when low mass items requiring a long assay time are needed.
High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry Data Set for High Burnup Pressurized Water Reactor Used Fuel
Susan K. Smith, Stephen Croft, Andrew D. Nicholson, Greg Nutter.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, TN, USA.
Over the past decade, considerable resources have been applied to investigate verification of used nuclear fuel assemblies for international safeguards. The opportunity to expand the available data used to validate these verification techniques was presented in 2016 by the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, which made 25 high-burnup pressurized water reactor used fuel rods available for measurement in the Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, a 2017 campaign measured the 25 used fuel rods with a high-resolution gamma spectrometer. A planar high-purity germanium detector was used to provide high-efficiency across an energy range from 60 keV to 3 MeV. Gamma spectra of individual fuel rods were collected in 4.5 mm steps along the entire length of each rod. In addition, spectra were collected on select rods in rotational increments of 30 degrees to provide data on the distribution of fission products along the rod perimeter. The spectra are stored on a controlled-access website for use by others. This paper describes the measurement geometry, used fuel rod characteristics, example spectra, and preliminary analyses performed during the measurement campaign.
Advancements on Spent Fuel Pools through Passive Cooling
Jonathan D. Hartman, Tyler M. Naughton, Sean K. Alcorn, Gavin M. Webb, Christopher R. Duff.
University of Tennessee Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, USA.
This project addresses the Fukushima accident where spent fuel pools lost forced cooling and overheated. Although fuel was never uncovered in the accident, it was just a matter of time before boil-off and rapid evaporation would have led to exposed fuel and consequent fuel melting. A system will be designed to use the radiation of the spent fuel to power back-up circulation pumps to cool the pool water. Exposed spent nuclear fuel rods can emit strong damaging radiation, particularly in the case of gamma rays, and can quickly lead to a significant safety concern. Therefore, the goal of this project is to utilize gamma production in the core to help safely bring the core to shut down in case of an accident like this. It is proposed to install solar cells within the fuel racks to produce electric power to operate circulation pumps. Solar cells are optimized for visible light. Gamma rays and any other photons with energy greater than the band gap of the solar cell semiconductor will generate charge carriers and therefore enable a current, but energy greater than the band gap is lost. In addition, the interaction cross section for gamma rays decreases with increasing energy resulting in many of the photons penetrating without interaction. These problems can be solved by using a scintillator similar to those used in radiation detectors. Plastic Scintillators will be used for this project. Sodium iodide and cesium iodide yield high levels of visible light in response to gamma ray bombardment and could be used as a filter for the solar cells, but plastic and glass scintillators can be used as well. Both solar cells and scintillators are inefficient, but the pool radiation level is intense and there is room for thousands of solar cells. These solar cells are designed and meant to provide as much cooling as possible in the event of complete station blackout. This external system would allow application to all existing nuclear power plants, and contribute to preventing another event similar to Fukushima from happening.
The G. Robert Keepin Nonproliferation Science Summer Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory
Chloe Verschuren1, Rian Bahran1, Bethany Goldblum2, James Miller1, Charlotte Carr2.
1Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA, 2University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has provided decades of leadership in nonproliferation. Fifty years of end-to-end international safeguards support to the International Atomic Energy Agency has included developing technology, training inspectors, and providing experts. Much of the laboratory’s legacy in this area was built on the shoulders of giants like G. Robert Keepin, the first pioneer of physics-based safeguards. Keepin believed that the United States should take a lead in nonproliferation and that Los Alamos was the right place to grow safeguards science and technology because of its unique mission, technical expertise, and facilities necessary for the required research and development (R&D). In 2017, LANL established the G. Robert Keepin Nonproliferation Science Summer Program, honoring this champion of international safeguards. The program was jointly established with the University of California at Berkeley-led Nuclear Science and Security Consortium with the goal of exposing students to the broader nuclear nonproliferation mission that is underpinned by advances in R&D. During the program’s inaugural summer, a cadre of 21 undergraduate and graduate students from 14 top-tier universities were provided an opportunity to spend an entire summer learning about how game-changing science, engineering, and technology are applied to reduce the dynamic threats of nuclear proliferation. The students spent a majority of their time performing research on real-world projects with a Los Alamos mentor. The program was designed such that the research experience was complemented by weekly activities that aimed to provide broad exposure to the nonproliferation mission space through lectures, hands-on training, and technical tours. Proximity to Sandia National Laboratory afforded the students an opportunity to spend two days exploring the facilities unique to Sandia. With excellent reviews from both the LANL mentors and students at the conclusion of the 2017 summer, the program was hailed as a tremendous success and a useful model for continued efforts to strengthen the national security workforce pipeline. A majority of students stated that they plan to continue working in careers supporting the nonproliferation mission, and most of them intend to do so at Los Alamos.
Feasibility study by experimental protocol to extend the domain of validity of an automated gamma counting system
Nathanaël Gombert, Guillaume Rousseau.
CEA, Is-sur-Tille, France.
The automatic gamma assay system “MADAGASCAR” is used for identifying and quantifying
radionuclides in waste drums produced by the French Alternatives Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) of Valduc. The segmented measurement allows to obtain two gamma spectrum, one with transmission source and another without transmission source,for each 25 centimeters segments of drums. The detection efficiency is obtained from the transmission measurement leading to a correction of the matrix attenuation. According to the initial calibration of the system, the measurement of drums is restricted both by density (above 0.4) and actinides mass (allowed until 5 grams). In order to increase the capacity of MADAGASCAR, a feasibility study was performed to extend the ranges of density and
actinides mass until 0.8 and 60 grams respectively. An experimental protocol and statistical tests were developed to validate these aims. This paper presents the results of this study and the involvement for the MADAGASCAR device.
Observation of Cerenkov photons produced in the glass window of a Hamamatsu PMT
Xianfei Wen, Andreas Enqvist.
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA.
Observation of Cerenkov photons produced in the glass window of a Hamamatsu PMT
Xianfei Wena, Andreas Enqvista
a549 Gale Lemerand Drive, Materials Science and Engineering, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA.
E-mails: email@example.com (X. Wen); firstname.lastname@example.org (A. Enqvist)
Cs2LiYCl6:Ce3+ (CLYC) has proven to be one of the promising scintillators for nuclear safeguards and homeland security applications, such as preventing theft or diversion of special nuclear materials. In our experimental studies with a CLYC based scintillation detector, fast pulses with decay time of a few nanoseconds were observed from the detector. These pulses are not generated from the scintillator itself because the decay times of the scintillation pulses have been shown to be significantly larger than a few nanoseconds (i.e. hundreds of ns vs a few ns). In this work a PMT which was the same as the one used in the CLYC detector was employed to investigate the origin of the fast pulses. The pulse height distributions measured with gamma rays with energy below the Cerenkov threshold of the PMT glass material were almost identical with the background spectrum. However, when using gamma rays having energy above the Cerenkov threshold non-negligible high-energy events were observed. A 252Cf source was also used to study the high-energy events with various shielding configurations. In addition, the response of the PMT to cosmic-ray muons was measured with the PMT facing different directions. It was found that the response to muons was sensitive to the PMT direction. To further investigate the direction sensitivity, the pulse height distributions measured with the PMT wrapped with Teflon tapes were compared with those acquired without the wrapping. A high resolution CCD camera is also being used to independently study the origin of the fast pulses. The outcomes obtained with the CCD camera will be compared with the results measured using the digitizer.
Paper Significance: This work demonstrated the origin of the fast pulses observed from a CLYC detector. The results are beneficial to the application of the CLYC detector in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security. They would also provide valuable information for rare event search using PMTs as photodetector.
Virtual Reality and 3D Models and Simulations for Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) Training
David K. Warner, Donovan Heimer, Ryan Knudsen, Olga Martin.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA.
Using COTS training tools, the Application and Modeling Development (AMD) Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory develops immersive demonstrations for nuclear security related training efforts in the US, as well as with our international partners. These demonstrations incorporate, for example, walk-throughs of nuclear materials processing facilities, as a means of providing models of nuclear material accounting and control measures, including physical inventory taking, nuclear material control systems, and material movements. LANL AMD team provides first person fully interactive simulations that supplement and include written procedures, as well as real world data and physics models for demonstration, training, and testing. In this paper, we will provide examples of 3D environments being developed for nuclear material accounting and control training and demonstration purposes. We will also discuss the capability of including real world data and physics models in our applications, as tailored to LANL nuclear security training efforts.
Automatic Notification of False Data Injection Cyber Attacks at a Nuclear Power Plant
Shannon Eggers, Andreas Enqvist.
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA.
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are gradually replacing aging analog control systems with digital systems. These digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems are cyber-physical systems that connect physical process equipment such as actuators and pumps with computational components such as networks and control software. While the installation of new DI&C systems improves process operation and enhances equipment reliability, this interconnectedness also introduces new cyber security vulnerabilities at NPPs. Although NPPs in the U.S. are required to maintain and implement a Physical Security Plan which includes a Cyber Security Plan, some experts believe that the nuclear industry underestimates the cyber threat. More specifically, coordinated cyber and physical attacks, in which adversaries physically damage equipment while simultaneously launching a false data injection attack to hide the incident from Operators, are considered to be poorly modeled in the design basis threat. Since the goal of a false data injection attack is to inject false signals or commands into a control system to gain or disrupt control of a system, traditional IT-based intrusion detection systems focused on monitoring network traffic may not detect these attacks. We previously evaluated the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA) machine learning intrusion detection algorithms for monitoring cyber attacks that spoof data to appear ‘normal’ in order to hide the effects of a simultaneous physical attack. Since most process monitoring systems won’t flag ‘normal’ data as an anomaly or an attack, new types of alarm thresholds are needed for these situations. By building on our previous work and testing with actual NPP process data, we propose novel thresholding algorithms that will alert Operators to the onset of a false data injection attack.
Blockchain Technology for KAERI Safeguards implementation
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea, Republic of.
The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfill the non-proliferation commitment they have made, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." In accordance with the IAEA role above, the role of the Member State has made it necessary to make safeguards of each country credible, transparent and effective. We have considered safer, less labor-intensive and faster methods than the current IAEA Security Channel, and in this paper we will talk about block-chain technology. If the various advantages of the block chain apply to IAEA safeguards, it will be a new phase. Particularly if IAEA member states have this infrastructure in well-equipped and well-run infrastructure, then substantial IAEA material resources and safeguards efficiency will be able to increase.
Off-Site Source Recovery Program; High Activity Beta/Gamma Removal, Transport and Disposition
James R. Cole1, Temeka Taplin2, Frank Cocina1, Rebecca Coel-Roback1.
1Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA, 2NNSA, Washington, DC, USA.
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security’s (ORS) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been tasked with the removal and disposition of radioactive sealed sources. It is the mission of the program to provide support, in the interest of national security and public health and safety, by preventing potentially harmful radioactive sealed sources from falling under the possession of individuals that would use this material for malicious intent. OSRP is a collaborative effort involving Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). At the inception of the program, Pu-239 was the only acceptable isotope to be recovered. As a wider security scope developed, OSRP expanded its mission to include the removal and disposal of other sources that posed a potential risk to national security, health, and safety. Starting in 2004, OSRP initiated its involvement in recovering higher-activity cesium and cobalt devices, largely from medical, research, and industrial facilities. These disused higher-activity devices present a burden to licensees in terms of security, and demand for OSRP’s assistance in removing them has been high. Today, OSRP removes around 40 high-activity devices per year in support of domestic demand as well as ORS’s Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP). In total, this equates to an average of over 50,000Ci of Cs-137 and Co-60 removed from the private sector per year for permanent disposition. A major component of this effort is the use of the proper shipping container to transport the various devices. As a way to increase transportation capabilities ORS has developed two new Type B containers. The most recently completed of these containers, the 435B, is currently certified to transport Gammacell 1000, Gammacell 3000, Gammacell 40, and Gammators in an overpack configuration. This provides greater capacity and flexibility to safely and effectively transport these devices, for which acceptable shipping configurations had been previously limited.