 Editor's
Note |
 Inside Insight |
 Award Nominations |
| INMM/ESARDA Workshop |
 Member News |
 Calendar |
 Archive |
 INMM
Home Page |
|
Volume 3, Number 3 Report on 2005 INMM/ESARDA Santa Fe Workshop: The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), through its International Safeguards Technical Division and Southwest Chapter, and the European Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA) held the fifth in a series of joint INMM/ESARDA workshops* on Oct. 30 – Nov. 2, 2005, in Santa Fe, N.M., USA. Under the topic Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges, the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop addressed in depth current issues in international safeguards and the nonproliferation regime. More than 100 workshop attendees had a full opportunity to actively participate in the discussions and communicate informally. There were participants from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States and from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission. A number of organizations and companies sponsored the meeting, which was held at La Fonda hotel, a Santa Fe historic site. The workshop opened with welcomes by the INMM Vice President Nancy Jo Nicholas and the ESARDA President Jérôme Joly. Speakers in the opening plenary session, chaired by Workshop Co-Chair Gotthard Stein, told the workshop that profound challenges and threats force us to re-think safeguards. Keynote speaker Dr. Victor Alessi, president and CEO, U.S. Industry Coalition, gave a stirring charge to urgently focus on prevention of the nuclear threat and to put more emphasis on public diplomacy. He also urged INMM and ESARDA to consider spreading nuclear approaches to the chemical and biological arenas. Speaking for the IAEA, Jill Cooley, director, Department of Safeguards, expressed the pride of the IAEA and its director general in receiving the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, saying it resulted primarily from the IAEA’s verification work in Iraq and its recent safeguards activities. She said the IAEA cannot rest on its laurels; continuing issues and verification challenges lie ahead. Referring to INMM and ESARDA as the two premier professional safeguards organizations, she said that such meetings facilitate an open exchange of information and ideas and play an important role in contributing to IAEA safeguards. Doris Ellis, International Security Programs, Sandia National Laboratories, and Sara Scott, Nuclear Nonproliferation Division Leader, Los Alamos National Laboratory, in a joint presentation, challenged the workshop to clarify the vision for the future of safeguards and what “safeguards culture” means, and to drive the dialogue between policy experts and technical leaders. Noting that areas we do not now know will become important, they emphasized the importance of a strong R&D base. Roland Schenkel, director general of the Joint Research Centre, European Commission, presented examples of successes in the development of “classical safeguards” and progress in the detection of undeclared/illicit activities. He challenged the workshop to propose ways to meet the needs for more effective approaches to nuclear security; to enhance techniques/methods to control “use” and to detect clandestine activities; to increase the potential of independent open source evaluation; and to enhance the role of inspectors from compliance at facilities to compliance at the state (regional) level. He stated the view that international cooperation and collaboration is key to worldwide security. John Carlson, director general, Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, concluded the plenary session by placing emphasis on consciously directing the cultural change in safeguards and at the IAEA. Two days of parallel sessions followed the opening plenary. Thirty-four presentations were made in three working groups, which each addressed one of the workshop themes: Further evolution of safeguards; Strengthening detection capability for safeguards; and Safeguards in a broader policy perspective. Introductory presentations by experts were following by full discussion. Working Groups Further evolution of safeguards was addressed by Working Group 1, chaired by Jill Cooley, IAEA, and Roger Howsley, UK. Presentations were given by Maurizio Boella, EC-TREN; Jim Casterton, CNSC, Canada; Jill Cooley, IAEA; Monika Eiborn, SKI, Sweden; Steve Mladineo, PNNL, USA; Kaoru Naito, NMCC, Japan; John Patten, IAEA; Arnold Rezniczek, ESA RDA/Germany; Jim Tape, USA; Tero Varjoranta, STUK, Finland, and Carl Van Handenhove, IAEA. This working group noted the high political significance of the IAEA’s work and the political decisions that can arise from the IAEA’s conclusions. The major evolution of the IAEA safeguards system is well underway to using state-level approaches as the basis for state evaluation and implementation of safeguards. These approaches take into account the features and characteristics of the state and its nuclear activities as well as the IAEA experience in the state. The IAEA recognizes the need for state-level approaches to be based on objective state-level factors, and for safeguards implementation and evaluation to be consistent and transparent, as well as for communicating to states. What the state does is also important. Where a state can facilitate the ability of the Secretariat to use all of its safeguards tools, safeguards can be better customized. And, the quality, timeliness and credibility of information available to IAEA about a state can differ. The IAEA highlighted its development of a quality management system for safeguards, which will encompass policy and objectives, organization, responsibilities, procedures, processes, and the resources to manage quality. It was stressed that quality management is not about slowing down progress and change; rather, it will ensure that defined and consistent processes and procedures are communicated to and used by IAEA staff and communicated to external stakeholders through an appropriate communication strategy. With the implementation of the additional protocol and integrated safeguards, the State System for Accounting and Control (SSAC) has become even more important. Investment by states in their SSACs is necessary to ensure the quality and timeliness of declarations, and to provide support for complementary access activities. The workshop heard reports on SSACs in Japan, Sweden, Finland and Euratom. Japan provides an example of enhanced SSAC cooperation, which has included protocol implementation trials, integrated safeguards approach rehearsals, and the use of facilities as test beds. The new IAEA safeguards inspector is emerging. Over the last five years, the work of IAEA inspectors has changed dramatically from doing mostly verification activities at facilities to also conducting complementary access, reviewing additional state declarations, and preparing state evaluation reports. To support this changing role, inspectors are being trained in new skills. As the role and responsibilities of inspectors continue to evolve, Roland Schenkel in the opening session suggested that the future inspector profile might include expert knowledge of plant operations, good language training, strengthened investigation abilities, and strengthened remote capabilities for inspectors. The workshop recognized that changing the safeguards culture requires commitment and change at all levels: state, organization, management and individual. Cultural change has to come from good leadership. Beliefs are not sufficient; behavior is what counts. The workshop found the change in safeguards culture to be underway, and was optimistic that with sufficient efforts and the right incentives, the change can be accomplished quickly. Strengthening Detection Capability for Safeguards was addressed by Working Group 2 chaired by Jacques Baute, IAEA, and John Matter, U.S. Presentations were given by Jacques Baute, IAEA; Dianna Blair, SNL, USA; Diane Fischer, ORNL, USA; Joao Gonçalves, EC-JRC; Bhupendra Jasani, Kings College, UK; Nicholas Kyriakopoulos, GWU, USA; Irmgard Niemeyer, Freiburg University, Germany; Michel Richard, CEA, France; Ron Saper, Vantage Point International, Canada; Mark Schanfein, LANL, USA; Marius Stein, Canberra Aquila, USA; Dieter Tillwick, NECSA, South Africa; Bob Truong, CNSC, Canada; Rick Wallace, LANL USA; and Maria Wallenius, EC-ITU. This working group noted that a nuclear weapons program produces numerous signatures and the ability to detect these signatures is fundamental for the assurance and credibility of state level assessments. Enhanced detection capabilities are necessary for IAEA verification activities to meet their objective of being the reference for proliferation assessment. Roland Schenkel in the opening plenary told the workshop that there are instruments to monitor the access to technologies and materials. The working group also noted that detection capability is dependent on legal authority. To properly position safeguards in the overall nonproliferation regime, there is a need to get out of the traditional box, e.g., to address non-fuel cycle R&D. Combating covert operations will require a strengthened regulatory framework, and more sharing of information on possible indicators among states and with the IAEA. Detection relies on all-source information acquisition, broad data fusion and analysis, coupled with effective inspection implementation. There is an absolute need for collaboration, and member states and the private sector must support these efforts, which involve legal, diplomatic, methodology, technology and human resource issues. Success will also depend on the IAEA utilizing historical knowledge and lessons learned, and keeping an open mind. The challenges are to optimize the use of the many available technologies and to integrate tools with analysis. The integration must span global phenomena (e.g., illicit trade) to particle measurements, and provide immediate answers to preserving historical knowledge. The major challenge is getting from data (paper, text or images) to information and knowledge for further action. It must be recognized that information sources of different types are sometimes deficient in quality, reliability and completeness. Effective information tools need to be easy to learn and simple to use, and provide high return on time invested and a significant payoff in new information and insights. While the major challenge is integration of different analysis tools, tools will not replace an analyst’s previous knowledge, intuition, and capabilities. In the area of physical detection tools, the workshop covered in detail environmental sampling, material sampling and satellite imagery, and provided an impressive overview of attended, unattended and remote monitoring systems, process monitoring and secure communication. Environmental and material sampling are now playing an essential role in safeguards for detection of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, but challenges remain in collection strategy and location, and limited laboratory analysis capacities. The evaluation process requires broad skills including knowledge of the entire fuel cycle and nuclear signatures and understanding of the analytical techniques. More human resources, training, nuclear signature studies and attribution databases, and better-integrated and user-friendly tools are needed. The Additional Protocol has driven the use of advanced analytical methods for detecting undeclared activities. An essential contribution is coming through nuclear forensics, which uncovers the information inherently available from material samples (e.g. production reactor type, age determination, geographic mine location). To support this, there is a critical need for reference databases. Resources are limited, while cross-specialty knowledge is indispensable. Satellite imagery has become an important asset to safeguards, providing spatial information, spectral information and temporal information over extended periods. The goal in optical monitoring of nuclear systems is to scan wide areas with medium resolution to detect areas of interest and then analyze small areas of interest with high resolution. For reactors, the feasibility of differentiating different types and operational conditions has been demonstrated. Thermal imagery allows nighttime analysis and detection of thermal anomalies. Hyperspectral imagery is being studied for monitoring uranium mines and detecting uranium signatures. The radar portion of the electromagnetic spectrum was highlighted for the first time; radar works at night, penetrates clouds and reveals invisible phenomena and some features (e.g., fences, power lines) better than optical. Progress has also been made in signature identification, automatic target recognition and change detection. Numerous further developments are expected, with safeguards benefiting from broader market drivers. But safeguards specific analysis and integration will be required, and the interaction of imagery analysts with field inspectors and the leveraging of resources between the IAEA and Member State Support Programs will be important. Developments in technology have already made major contributions to the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. And a variety of emerging technologies, which are diverse in application and maturity level, have potential use in safeguards. The challenge will be to choose wisely. In order to continue to meet unique safeguards requirements while addressing the issue of investment and return, the creation of a Center of Excellence for the Development of Safeguards Instrumentation was proposed. This Center would be responsive to the uniqueness of the IAEA safeguards market and would recognize the roles and strengths of the IAEA, Member State Support Programs, R&D institutions and companies. Success in meeting the expectations for detection of undeclared activities will be based on defining system architecture, optimizing human resources, and addressing funding:
Safeguards in a broader policy perspective was addressed by Working Group 3 chaired by Jon Phillips, U.S.A. and Wilhelm Gmelin, Germany. Presentations were given by Marc Albert, CEA, France; John Carlson, ASNO, Australia; Wilhelm Gmelin, Germany; Rich Hooper, USA; Myron Kratzer, USA; Kiyokazu Ota, JAEA, Japan; Jon Phillips, DOS, USA; Joe Pilat, LANL, USA; Jon Sanborn, DOS, USA; Tom Shea, PNNL, USA; and Norm Wulf, USA. The questions posed to Working Group 3 were:
Presentations were made on: INFCIRCs 153 and 540—Origins and contemporary issues; the NPT regime and the changing role of IAEA; issues from the 2005 NPT review conference; export control—what should be done; U.S. Additional Protocol status; multilateral nuclear activities; verifying treaty compliance; and proliferation resistance and new nuclear technology. Each presentation stimulated extensive discussion. The report on this working group report will be available later. Other Events and Conclusion A special event titled Retrospective on INFIRCs 153 and 540 was organized on Sunday afternoon before the workshop by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory with U.S. Department of Energy support. Four one-hour interviews were filmed involving Myron Kratzer, Rich Hooper and Norm Wulf, who played leading roles in the development of the legal underpinnings of international safeguards. Tom Shea, PNNL, and Jill Cooley, IAEA, moderated the interviews, which will be made into a living history DVD. The highlight of the workshop dinner was an entertaining and insightful talk by Richard Raaz, general manager, Washington TRU Solutions, who spoke on his colorful career with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Energy and now WIPP. The variety of events, the well prepared presentations, the skillful guidance of the working group chairs, the active participation of workshop attendees and the time available for discussion combined to make the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop a success. Jim Larrimore, Chair, and Gotthard Stein, Vice Chair, INMM ISD
Note: The previous joint INMM/ESARDA workshops were held in 1996 in Arona, Italy, hosted by ESARDA; in 1998 in Albuquerque, N.M., U.S.A., hosted by INMM; in 2000 in Tokyo, hosted by the Japan INMM Chapter and ISD; and in 2003 in Como, Italy, hosted by ESARDA and the European Commission Ispra Joint Research Center. The topic addressed by the first three workshops was “Science and Modern Technology for Safeguards.” The topic addressed by the 2003 Workshop was “Safeguards Perspectives for a Future Nuclear Environment."
|